S. 5400
STRIDE Act
Sponsor: John R. Curtis · 0 cosponsors
Official summary
Written by the Congressional Research Service.
Semiconductor Technology Resilience, Integrity, and Defense Enhancement Act or the STRIDE Act
This bill requires the Department of State to coordinate with the governments of other countries to prevent the Chinese Communist Party and other foreign adversaries from acquiring critical semiconductor technologies.
Specifically, the State Department must coordinate actions with governments of countries (partner countries) that maintain significant capabilities in semiconductor technology research, design, manufacturing, materials, equipment, or equipment subsystems and components.
Among other coordination objectives, the State Department must seek to achieve (1) alignment of export control policies regarding semiconductor technology manufacturing equipment and the critical subcomponents needed to produce such equipment; and (2) expanded restrictions on semiconductor technology design tools, intellectual property transfers, equipment servicing, and technical assistance that could enable semiconductor technology development capabilities in North Korea, China, Russia, or Iran.
The State Department must regularly assess the extent to which partner countries are implementing measures consist with U.S. policy described by the bill. If the State Department determines a partner country is not sufficiently implementing security measures, then the State Department must take specified actions, such as requesting that the Department of Commerce convene a meeting of the Export Administration Review Board (EARB) to identify and execute a plan of action. Further, the State Department must provide recommendations to the EARB to apply foreign direct product rule restrictions to semiconductor technology produced in the partner country that incorporates U.S.-origin technology, software, or equipment.
Finally, the State Department must report to Congress every 90 days.
Text of the bill
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the global semiconductor technology supply chain is critical to United States and allied national security, economic competitiveness, and technological leadership;
(2) the Chinese Communist Party is pursuing strategies to dominate the semiconductor technology industry to assist in its military modernization efforts and human rights abuses through nonmarket practices, export control violations and avoidance, economic espionage, military-civil fusion, and predatory investment;
(3) the integrity of the global semiconductor technology supply chain requires coordinated action with allied and partner countries to prevent technological capture by the Chinese Communist Party and other foreign adversaries;
(4) unilateral export controls for protecting critical semiconductor technologies can be amplified with multilateral coordination; and
(5) fully utilizing certain unilateral United States export control authorities, including the Foreign Direct Product Rule, has proven effective at preventing circumvention or avoidance of United States export controls through third-country production.